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A. Introduction 
In Idaho Independent Bank's ("IIB" or the "Bank") Brief, the Bank raises 
an additional issue on appeal. Respondents Brief, p. 10. That issue was not in 
contention before the district court at the Motion for Reconsideration as the district 
court did not grant summary judgment pursuant to those arguments. R 947-54 (the 
district court's ruling on IIB's motion for summary judgment). As such, the 
Frantzes have not yet addressed IIB's newly raised arguments. Resultantly, there 
are supplemental facts important in addressing the Bank's new issues. 
B. Supplemental Facts 
The Eagle Ridge on Twin Lakes project (the "Project"), not to be confused 
with the corporation Eagle Ridge on Twin Lakes, Inc. ("Eagle Ridge"), was 
acquired/owned and funded at least as follows: 
1. Purpose: Acquisition of I 04 acres 
Date: September 22, 2005 
Borrower: Twin Lakes Eagle View Estates, LLC 1 
Guarantor: The Frantzes 
Lender: Idaho Independent Bank 
Loan Amount: $837,750.00 
1 A limited liability company wholly owned and/or controlled by the Frantzes. 
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("SR. 1 note 
by Twin Lakes Eagle View Estates, LLC for the Project, which documents the 
above information). 
2. Purpose: Construction Funding 
Date: April 19, 2006 
Borrower: Twin Lakes Eagle View Estate, LLC 
Guarantor: The Frantzes 
Lender: IIB 
Loan Amount: $3,000,000.00 
See SR 9-19 (mortgage in favor ofIIB documenting the above information). 
3. Purpose: Acquisition of 50 additional acres. 
Date: November 30, 2006 
Borrower: Twin Lakes Property, LLC3 
Guarantor: The Frantzes 
Lender: IIB 
Loan Amount: $828,700.00 
See SR 20 (satisfaction of mortgage in favor of Twin Lakes Property, LLC 
document the above information). 
4. Purpose: Construction Funding 
Date: December 14, 2006 
Borrower: Eagle Ridge4, the company (not to be confused with the 
Project) 
Guarantor: The Frantzes 
2 A motion to augment the record will be submitted promptly. 
3 An entity wholly owned and/or controlled by the Frantzes. 
4 Yet another entity wholly owned and/or controlled by the Frantzes. 
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Lender: 
Loan Amount: $3,750,000.00 
See R 305-06 (Promissory note which reflects the above information). 
5. Pm pu:s.:; Cuu:sti udiuu F uudiug Iu~n;a:st:: 
Date: July 11, 2007 
Borrower: Eagle Ridge 
Guarantor: The Frantzes 
Lender: IIB 
Loan Amount: $4,5000,000.00 
See R 307-08 (Promissory note documenting the above information). 
6. Purpose: Construction Funding Extension 
Date: April 17, 2008 
Borrower: Eagle Ridge 
Guarantor: The Frantzes 
Lender: IIB 
Loan Amount: $4,5000,000.00 
See R 309 (Change in Terms Agreement documenting the above information). 
7. Purpose: Construction Funding Extension 
Date: January 21, 2009 
Debtor: Eagle Ridge 
Borrower: The Frantzes 
Lender: IIB 
Loan Amount: $4,5000,000.00 
See R.312-13 (Promissory Note documenting the above information). 
During all five years of lending activity with the Project, only two things 
remain constant: the Guarantor (the Frantzes), and the Lender (IIB). There were 
Appellant's Reply Brief- Pg. 3 
numerous place 
controlled by the Frantzes. Eagle Ridge was merely one of many entities to whom 
IIB actually lent money. Further, all notes, mortgages, and guarantees were 
virtually identical (with the exceptions being: the borrower, the amount, and the 
maturity date). All other terms (including the interest rate5) were fixed between the 
parties. 
In 2008, the Frantzes were able to generate more than $3,100,000.00 from a 
sale/leaseback of one of their assets. R 485 (An IIB loan memorandum discussing 
that Mr. Frantz generated "$3.4MM."). At that point, the Frantzes discussed with 
the Bank what to do with the funds: pay down the Eagle Ridge loan, or invest the 
money into the Project. R 411. The one issue, however, was the fact that if the 
Frantzes invested their money into the Project, they knew they would not have 
enough capital to fund the Project's infrastructure to completion. The Frantzes 
knew they would not have enough money. R 411, 124 - R 412, 128. So, they 
went and discussed the matter with the Bank and told the Bank as much. Id. In 
response, IIB made the oral promise/agreement in contention in this case. 
5 The interest rate did change, but it was based off of Prime. R 486. As such, 
while the actual interest percentage number changed, the formula used to derive 
that number remained constant. 
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it 
continue to lend money. Id. Instead, IIB promised the Frantzes that it would 
continue to lend money under the same parameters as it had been doing for the last 
several years so long as the Frantzes were creditworthy and the appraisal of the 
collateral (the Project) justified the loan. Id. The bank was not stepping out on a 
limb to make that promise. After all, that is what a bank does: it makes loans to 
people who are creditworthy with collateral that justifies the loan. That is all IIB 
promised to do: make a loan if there was sufficient collateral and a creditworthy 
guarantor. 
There is no reason why a bank would not make such a promise. If a party is 
creditworthy and the collateral is sufficient, there would be no reason to deny such 
a loan; particularly for a client with whom a bank has an extensive relationship and 
who bears more than $2,300,000.00 on deposit with the bank. R 486 (IIB detailing 
the substantial deposits the Frantzes had with the Bank). The Frantzes' affirmative 
defenses are not based on some fanciful claim that the Bank went beyond its 
normal practices and promised to make a vague future loan. Indeed, IIB merely 
promised to do what it does: it promised to continue issuing loans if the guarantor 
was creditworthy and the collateral justified it. 
Appellant's Reply Brief- Pg. 5 
2009, an appraisal 
'"Upon Completion6" value at $15,790,000.00. R 256-61 (a copy of a portion of 
the appraisal IIB ordered in late 2009 determining the collateral's value). As such, 
the collateral justified the loan. Additionally, IIB, in 2010 underwrote the Frantzes 
and found them creditworthy. In fact, IIB approved the Frantzes in underwriting 
and offered them and Eagle Ridge a three year extension on the $4,500,000.00 
outstanding loan. See 21-128 (the unsigned documents which IIB had prepared for 
the three year extension7). The Frantzes never executed these documents because 
they did not provide the additional funding necessary to complete the Project, 
which funding IIB had promised. 
That three year loan extension was neither an oral offer nor a preliminary 
commitment. The Bank had spent time, money, and effort fully underwriting the 
Frantzes and preparing every document necessary for IIB to collateralize the 
Project. Id. All documents were ready to go and had been delivered to the 
Frantzes for signature. 
6 Also known as, "As Completed" value. 
7 The loan date was "4-19-2010" and the maturity date was "04-15-2013," three 
years. 
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the Frantzes more 
than $15,000,000.00 in collateral, IIB refused to honor its promise/agreement; IIB 
refused to do what it, as a bank, does. Ultimately, IIB refused to provide the 
needed funding for the completion of the Project. Of course, after having spent all 
their money on the Project, the Frantzes were without sufficient resources to 
complete the Project. Being unable to complete the Project, the Frantzes had no 
source of income large enough and liquid enough to pay off the nearly 
$4,500,000.00 loan. 
IIB made promises to the Frantzes. Those promises were not "too good to 
be true." They were promises that the Bank would do what it is supposed to do: 
lend money to creditworthy customers who have sufficient collateral. After the 
Frantzes poured their time, energy and money into the Project and were left with 
little but their reliance on IIB 's promise, IIB pulled the rug out from underneath 
them. That unconscionable conduct cannot be allowed to stand. More 
importantly, IIB's documents (i.e. the guarantees) do not bar the Frantzes from 
asserting their affirmative defenses because, while they wave almost everything 
under the sun, they do not waive their affirmative defenses based on estoppel. 
Appellant's Reply Brief- Pg. 7 
The Terms of IIB's Promise/Agreement the Frantzes 
While IIB contends otherwise, the terms ofIIB's promise/agreement were 
definite and readily ascertainable: 
1) Amount: The amount reasonably necessary for the Project to be completed, 
but at no time will this amount exceed 60% of the most recent "as 
completed" evaluation performed by a licensed real estate appraiser. R 137. 
Loan memorandums prepared by IIB demonstrate that this method was used 
by the Bank in determining the reasonableness of the amount of the loan. 
See R. 4868 (discussing the loan to value ratio); see also S.R. 143. This 
number/amount was always easily and simply determined by looking at the 
most recent appraisal's "as completed" value and multiplying it by 0.6. 
2) Interest Rate: The interest rate was to be the Prime rate +2%. IIB's 
previous loan interest rates followed the Commercial Loan Pricing 
Guideline, which specified that, "a spread to our best customer on land 
development loans should be 2% over Prime with a floor of 8.25%". R. 486 
(under the section "Structure:" section the loan memorandum discusses the 
basis for the interest rate). IIB had a formula for determining the interest 
8See SR 129-31 for a more readable version. 
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was capable 
That rate was Prime plus 2%. Id.; see also S.R. 132. That method was to be 
continued and followed. While historically, all ofIIB's loans funding the 
Project's development contained varying interest rates, that is only because 
Prime (which is subject to a ready determination) moved and changed over 
the years. 
3) The Disbursement Schedule: Like the others terms, the disbursement 
schedule was to be as it had always been. IIB would disburse the funds 
upon request and proof of expenditure. That's how it had always been done 
before. See S.R. 133-42 (two examples of draw requests for the construction 
funding). That's how it was supposed to continue being disbursed. 
4) The Security of the Loan: This, too, was definite. The continuing security 
for the loan was to be the same 104 acres that IIB had held as security for 
years plus the newly acquired 50 acres. R 483. 
5) Parties' rights after Default: The parties had always used the exact same 
language for each loan (note and mortgage). See R. 19-54 (the identical 
notes/mortgages/personal guarantees executed over the years). The Frantzes 
always signed the exact same personal guaranty. Id. All rights after default 
Appellant's Reply Brief- Pg. 9 
note/mortgage/personal guaranty never were 
change or be altered. They would remain the same as they had always been. 
While the maturity date was not discussed specifically, all loans in the past had 
typically lasted less than a year. See R 305-14 (the Promissory Notes made to 
Eagle Ridge). It is important to note that, when reviewing a contract to see if its 
terms are sufficiently definite "none of [ the terms] individually are determinative." 
Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 141 Idaho 362, 367 (2005). 
In this case, the Frantzes and IIB had nearly every aspect of the loan worked 
out because they had been doing business together for so long and had used the 
same language over and over and over again. In their agreement, there were to be 
no deviations from the norm. The only things that were to change was the amount 
(which was to be determined as a specific percentage of the "as completed" value 
of the collateral) and the duration, which would be for a year or less (at which 
point the loan and Project would be reevaluated). As a result, the promise which 
IIB made was certain, definite and capable of being enforceable. 
More importantly, to keep this appeal in perspective, all the Frantzes must 
proffer is a genuine dispute of fact to withstand summary judgment (with all 
inferences being drawn in the Frantzes' favor). In this case, there is ample 
Appellant's Reply Brief- Pg. 10 
parties' history and course substantiate 
that the Bank's agreement was to "continue" to do what it had always done: fund 
the Project to completion with all terms to remain the same except the due date and 
the amount. 
IIB promised to continue to lend with all the same terms that had always 
been in the loans issued since the Project began. The only terms that were to 
change were the amount and the due date. All else was to be as it always was. See 
R 412, ,28 ("Under [IIB's promise] IIB agreed to lend the construction funds .. 
. under the same loan terms as the then existing loan between IIB and Eagle 
Ridge ... " (emphasis added)); see also R 139-40 ("IIB represented to Frantz's that 
IIB had already underwritten the final round of funding for the project and had 
found the Frantz's to be creditworthy for a three year extension ... on the same or 
similar terms of the prior construction loans to Eagle Ridge." ( emphasis 
added)); see also R. 137 ("IIB represented to Frantz's that IIB would continue to 
fund development loans ... " (emphasis added)). 
Using the term "continue to fund" at the very least infers that all terms 
would be the same except for those expressly and routinely altered. Merriam-
Webster dictionary defines "continue" as: "to maintain without interruption a 
Appellant's Reply Brief- Pg. 11 
" Merriam-Webster < 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/co https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/continuentinue> (accessed Jan. 19, 2017). The Frantzes 
wanted to maintain the loans which had been issued, which loans all had identical 
terms except for the maturity date, the amount, the borrower9, and the interest rate 
(which rate was based on the Prime lending rate, an easily ascertainable figure). 
With the above mentioned references, in connection with the extensive 
history of prior dealings (which included loan terms identical to one another) the 
Frantzes have provided at least a genuine dispute of facts of whether or not there 
was a promise/agreement- with terms definite enough to be enforced- in existence. 
As such, the district court's entry of summary judgment should be overturned. 
D. The Record is Replete with Support for the Proposition that IIB 
Entered into an Oral Agreement with the Frantzes. 
IIB, in its brief, claims that the record does not support the Frantzes' 
contention that IIB entered into an oral agreement with them as individuals. See 
9 IIB did not care who the borrower was, so long as the borrower was the owner of 
the Project. IIB never asked for any financials of the borrower; instead, IIB always 
looked to the financial strength of the guarantors, the Frantzes. As such, IIB was 
not concerned about the identity of the borrower. 
Appellant's Reply Brief- Pg. 12 
IIB errs 
testimony. In support ofIIB's contention, it points to two locations in the record: 
R, p. 134 (the Frantzes' Amended Answer). R, p. 425 (the Frantzes' reply to IIB's 
objection to mediating this matter). Neither example supports IIB 's theory because 
neither reference claims that IIB's representations were exclusively made to Eagle 
Ridge. IIB tries to add language into the record which simply is not present. 
Frantzes' Statement 
IIB is barred from pursuing this suit 
against the Frantzes because IIB's 
claims are the proximate result of IIB 's 
action "in breaching its contract with 
Eagle Ridge to provide funding to 
complete the Eagle Ridge project. .. " 
"All of the interactions between Marty 
Frantz and IIB were in behalf of Eagle 
Ridge on Twin Lakes." 
IIB's Interpretation of Frantzes' 
Statement 
IIB is barred from pursuing this suit 
against the Frantzes because IIB's 
claims are the proximate result ofIIB's 
action "in breaching its contract which 
was made exclusively with Eagle Ridge 
to provide funding to complete the 
Eagle Ridge project. .. " ( emphasized 
language added). 
"All of the interactions between Marty 
Frantz and IIB were exclusively made 
in behalf of Eagle Ridge on Twin 
Lakes" ( emphasized language added). 
The first instance upon which IIB relied does not indicate that the oral contract IIB 
made with Eagle Ridge was made exclusively with Eagle Ridge. Yet, IIB pretends 
Appellant's Reply Brief- Pg. 13 
it sense 
whatsoever. 
The second instance is not sworn testimony, nor is it made by any party to 
any related litigation. More importantly, however, it does not indicate that Mr. 
Frantz acted exclusively on behalf of Eagle Ridge; only that when he did act, it was 
at least on behalf of Eagle Ridge. 10 In short, IIB attempts to improperly use the 
maxim, expression unius est exclusion alterius (the expression of one thing is the 
exclusion of another). See St. Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Assocs., 
LLP, 148 Idaho 479,487 (2009). Not only is application of that maxim not 
mandatory, but it "is only a tool used to determine legislative intent. It is not an 
unimpeachable rule of law." Id.; Hewson v. Asker's Thrift Shop, 120 Idaho 164, 
166-67 (1991). Additionally, in St. Alphonsus, this Court also looked at the 
context of the matter to determine ifthere was a reason to apply the maxim. Id. at 
487. 
The context of the Frantzes' Answer and Counterclaim overwhelmingly 
supports the position that the Frantzes consider IIB's oral promise to have been 
10 It is important to note that the case in which that document was filed was not 
even this case. Further, it was not prepared or sworn to by either of the Frantzes. 
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both the Frantzes and Eagle Ridge. There are eighteen in the 
Frantzes Answer and Counterclaim which reference the fact that IIB orally made a 
promise to the Frantzes! See Appellant's Opening Brief, pp. 12-17. Not one of 
those references, however, claims that IIB's promise was made exclusively to the 
Frantzes. None of them exclude the possibility that it was also made to Eagle 
Ridge. As IIB pointed out, in that same document, the Frantzes also assert that IIB 
breached its promise to Eagle Ridge. 
So, one could be left with the impression that: 1) the Frantzes testimony is 
inconsistent (which requires the reader to assume that expression unius est 
exclusion alterius), or 2) that the Frantzes have always and all-along contended 
that the IIB's representations were to both the Frantzes personally (as guarantors) 
and to Eagle Ridge (the borrower, for whom Mr. Frantz was President). The latter 
option allows the Frantzes' statements to be read for face value without producing 
an absurd result (it being absurd for the Frantzes, under the advice of counsel who 
drafted those documents, to have made several inconsistent statements, some of 
which are in the same document). 
Even then, it should be remembered that all the Frantzes need to do to 
survive the summary judgment motion is to produce something more than a 
Appellant's Reply Brief- Pg. 15 
scintilla evidence that there are dispute which a genume issue. 
Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233, 108 P.3d 380, 385 (2005). The 
Frantzes have more than eighteen times across five different occasions 11 in sworn 
testimony stated that IIB made promises to them, personally. See Appellant's 
Opening Brief, pp. 12-24. 
As a result, there is more than just a scintilla of evidence that the Frantzes 
have alleged and provided repeated testimony that IIB's promisees at least 
included the Frantzes, if not others. Resultantly, the district court's grant of 
summary judgment on the basis that the Frantzes were not privy to the Bank's 
agreement/promise should be reversed. 
E. The Frantzes have not Waived their right to Assert their Affirmative 
Defenses 
While it is true that the Frantzes' personal guarantees are chock-full of 
waivers, Idaho law requires a waiver to be clear and unequivocal. Knipe Land Co., 
151 Idaho 449,458 (2011) ("a waiver will not be inferred except from a clear and 
11 1) The Frantzes' Verified Answer and Counterclaim, 2) Mr. Frantz's personal 
deposition, 3) Mr. Frantz's declaration, 4) Mr. Frantz's Declaration in Oppossition 
to IIB's Motion for Summary Judgment, and 5) the Frantzes' responses to IIB's 
Interrogatories. 
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an to the 
actually indicate that the Frantzes waive their right to assert the affirmative 
defenses they have alleged. IIB cites various provisions in the guarantees: 
Contract Provision 
CONTINUING GUARANTEE OF 
PAYMENT AND 
PERFORMANCE. 
For good and valuable consideration, 
Guarantor absolutely and 
unconditionally guarantees full and 
punctual payment and satisfaction of 
the Indebtedness of Borrower to 
Lender, and the performance and 
discharge of all Borrower's 
obligations under the Note and the 
Related Documents. This is a 
guaranty of payment and 
performance and not of collection, 
so Lender can enforce this Guaranty 
against Guarantor even when Lender 
has not exhausted Lender's remedies 
against anyone else obligated to pay 
the Indebtedness or against any 
collateral securing the Indebtedness, 
this Guaranty or any other guaranty 
Waiver Analysis 
Nowhere in this provision do 
the Frantzes clearly and 
unequivocally waive their 
right to file affirmative 
defenses against the Bank. 
It's true, it states that the 
Frantzes will make payment 
"without set-off 12or deduction 
13or counterclaim," however, 
the Frantzes affirmative 
defenses do not include a set-
off, deduction or counterclaim. 
The Frantzes affirmative 
defenses would, upon being 
proven, bar IIB from entirely 
from pursuing their claim. 
That is not an amount. As 
such, it is not a set-off or a 
deduction because the 
Frantzes' affirmative defenses 
do not seek to setoffIIB's loan 
by an amount owed to the 
12 "Set-off' is defined as, "A debtor's right to reduce the amount of a debt by any 
sum the creditor owes the debtor." "Setoff' Black's Law Dictionary 1581 (10th Ed. 
2014 )( delux ). 
13 "Deduction" is defined as, "The act or process of subtracting or taking away." 
Id. at p. 501. 
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of the Indebtedness. Guarantor will 
make any payments to Lender or its 
order, on demand, in legal tender of 
the United States, in same-day 
funds, without set-off or deduction 
, 1 • I or coumerc1aim ... 
If Lender presently holds one or 
more guaranties, or hereafter 
receives additional guaranties from 
Guarantor, Lender's rights under all 




Guarantor represents and warrants to 
Lender that (A) no representations or 
agreements of any kind have been 
made to Guarantor which would limit 
or qualify in any way the terms of this 
Guaranty ... 
GUARANTOR'S WAIVERS. 
Except as prohibited by applicable 
law, Guarantor waives any right to 
require Lender (A) to continue 
lending money or to extend other 
credit to Borrower; ... ( C) to resort 
for payment or to proceed directly or 
at once against any person, including 
Borrower or any other guarantor; (D) 
to roceed direct! a ainst or exhaust 
Appellant's Reply Brief- Pg. 18 
This provision does not 
discuss waivers at all. If its 
purported intent is for the 
Frantzes to waive any and all 
affirmative defenses, it does 
not do so clearly or 
unequivocally as there is no 
mention of any affirmative 
defenses. 
As to the first paragraph, there 
is no applicable waiver found. 
As to the second paragraph, 
the Frantzes affirmative 
defenses are not based on 
suretyship or impairment of 
collateral. As such, this 
paragraph does not stand for 
the Frantzes' waiver of their 
affirmative defenses. 
I any collateral held by Lender from 
Borrower, any other guarantor, or 
any other person ... 
Guarantor also waives any and all 
rights or defenses based on 
suretyship or impairment of 
collateral, including, but not limited 
to, any rights or defenses arising by 
reason of (A) ... , (B) ... , (C) any 
disability or other defense of 
Borrower, of any other guarantor, or 
of any other person, or by reason of 
the cessation of Borrower's liability 
from any cause whatsoever, other 
than payment in full in legal tender, 
of the indebtedness ... 
Guarantor further waives and agrees 
not to assert or claim at any time any 
deductions to the amount guaranteed 
under this Guaranty for any claim of 
setoff, counterclaim, counter 
demand, recoupment or similar right, 
whether such claim, demand or right 
may be asserted by the Borrower, the 
Guarantor, or both. 
I 
Likewise, the third paragraph 
waives only claims for "setoff, 
counterclaim, counter demand, 
[or] recoupment 14." This, like 
the other prov1s1ons, does not 
address the Frantzes ability to 
file and prosecute their 
affirmative defenses. As 
discussed above, the Frantzes 
do not seek to set-off or 
counterclaim through their 
affirmative defenses. 
14 "Recoupment" is defined as being synonymous with "Settoff." "Recoupment" 
Black's Law Dictionary 1466 (10th Ed. 2014)(delux). Black's also states, "In 
modern practice, the recoupment has been replaced by the compulsory 
counterclaim." Id. 
Appellant's Reply Brief- Pg. 19 
GUARANTOR'S 
UNDERSTANDING WITH 
RESPECT TO WAIVERS. 
Guarantor warrants and agrees that 
each of the waivers set forth above is 
made with Guarantor's full 
knowledge of its significance and 
consequences and that, under the 
circumstances, the waivers are 
reasonable and not contrary to public 
policy or law. 
provision simply 
irrelevant because, as pointed 
out above, the Frantzes did not 
waive their right to assert their 
affirmative defenses. 
R pp. 315-44. As can be seen from above, there are no clear or unequivocal 
waivers of the Frantzes' affirmative defenses. The Frantzes have not asserted an 
affirmative defense of set-off, a deduction, a counterclaim, nor an affirmative 
defense based on suretyship law. As such, they have not waived their ability to 
bring the affirmative defenses listed in their First Amended Answer. R 133-34. 
Resultantly, the district court's judgment ( or any amendment thereof) cannot be 
affirmed on the basis of waiver. 
F. The Guarantees do not Preclude Consideration of the Bank's Oral 
Promise/ Agreement 
While it is true that the Frantzes did waive the right to require IIB ''to 
continue lending money or to extend other credit to Borrower," that waiver is 
Appellant's Reply Brief- Pg. 20 
to credit issued "to Borrower." "' 1 pp . .J~ lS 
defined term in the guarantees. R 317. In the Guarantees, "Borrower" is 
exclusively limited to Eagle Ridge, the corporation. However, the Frantzes have 
not alleged that IIB would issue a loan to Eagle Ridge. Instead, the Frantzes have 
asserted that IIB would continue to fund the development of the Project, not the 
corporation, Eagle Ridge. The following sworn assertions by the Frantzes 
illustrate this: 
From the inception of the Eagle Ridge on Twin Lakes project, IIB 
represented to the Frantz's, that so long as they were creditworthy, 
IIB would fund development loans for Eagle Ridge at Twin Lakes 
[which is the name of the Project, there is no "Inc." designation] ... 
through completion of the project." 
R 136 (sworn testimony in the Frantzes' Amended Verified Answer) 
( emphasis added). 
One strategy proposed by Frantz's, was to restructure the project, have 
Frantz inject new capital, and purchase additional land thereby 
improving the loan to ratio of the loan allowing for increasing 
construction funding of the development as IIB had done in the 
past and represented to the Frantz's it would do in the future. 
Id. ( emphasis added). 
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IIB represented to Frantz's that IIB would continue to fund 
development loans but would only be able to do so at a ratio of sixty 
( 60%) loan to value because of the economic downturn. 
R 137 (emphasis added). This does not indicate that the loans were to be issued to 
the Eagle Ridge corporation. 
In reliance upon IIB's promise to provide financing as described 
above to complete the Eagle Ridge project, Frantz's personally 
invested substantial amounts of capital into the project during the end 
of 2008, 2009, and 2010 and reconfigured the Eagle Ridge project. 
Id. ( emphasis added). Again, there is no reference of the loan being issued 
to the Eagle Ridge corporation; only funding to complete the Project. 
However, IIB refused to honor its commitment to fund the 
completion of the project and instead changed its position and 
refused to fund completion of the project. 
Id. ( emphasis added). There is still no mention of extending a loan to the 
Eagle Ridge corporation. The entire focus was on finishing the Project. 
IIB is equitably estopped to deny the contract and to perform the 
contract as agreed between the parties by providing funding for 
completion of the Eagle Ridge project ... 
R 140 ( emphasis added). Combined with the fact that the Frantzes planned on 
providing 50 acres as additional collateral (which acreage was not a part of the 
original 104 acres mortgaged by the Bank and which acreage was owned by a 
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separate entity, other than Eagle Ridge1 it was more than probable that the 
would be made to a different entity, an entity that was not the Eagle Ridge 
corporation. As long as the Borrower was owned/controlled by the Frantzes and 
the Frantzes were personal guarantors, the Bank did not care who the Borrower 
was. 
Consequently, since IIB 's promise was not that it would continue to lend 
money to Eagle Ridge (the corporation), but instead that it would extend loans to 
finish the Project, the Bank's promise was not waived by the Frantzes when they 
agreed that they would not require IIB to continue to lend money to Eagle Ridge 
(the corporation). After all, the only right waived was the Frantzes' right to require 
IIB to lend to the Eagle Ridge corporation. IIB's own guarantees (which it 
unilaterally wrote) only restricted the Frantzes from requiring IIB to lend to the 
Eagle Ridge corporation. However, the Frantzes are not, in their affirmative 
defenses, claiming that IIB should have loaned money to the Eagle Ridge 
corporation. Since the beginning, the Frantzes have maintained that IIB was 
required to loan money so that the (Eagle Ridge) Project could be completed. The 
15 R 431-34 (The Frantzes response to IIB's interrogatory which outlines that the 
50 acres were never owned by Eagle Ridge, but by other entities). 
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transactions would have certainly been a different 
entity since the Eagle Ridge corporation did not own the additional 50 acre 
collateral that was going to be hypothecated to the Bank. R. 431-34. Furthermore, 
the past history of the Project demonstrates that there were multiple entities acting 
as "Borrower," which entities were switched out for various reasons. Since Eagle 
Ridge did not own the 50 acres it could not have pledged it as an asset. The 
Frantzes requiring IIB to continue to loan money to finish the Project does not 
violate the Frantzes' waiver, because the Frantzes merely waived their right to 
require IJB to loan money to the Eagle Ridge corporation. 
Likewise, the Frantzes' acknowledgment that "no representations or 
agreements of any kind have been made to Guarantor which would limit or qualify 
in any way the terms of this Guaranty" does not bar the Frantzes' affirmative 
defenses either. At no point have the Frantzes alleged that the Bank's oral 
agreement/promise limited or qualified the guarantees. There are no allegations 
that the Bank promised that it would not collect on the guarantees. There are no 
allegations that IIB promised it would first go after the collateral. There are no 
allegations that IIB could only act on the guarantees if it provided the funding. In 
fact, the oral promise/agreement from the Bank did not address the guarantees at 
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except the extent that it acknowledged that the Frantzes 
guaranty any loan provided for the purpose of finishing the Project. 
to 
In and of itself, the Bank's oral promise/agreement does not alter, amend, 
limit, or qualify in any way the guarantees. As such, the oral promise does not 
violate the Frantzes' representation of such. Consequently, it cannot be found that 
the Frantzes guarantees preclude them from raising IIB 's oral promise/agreement 
in their affirmative defenses. 
G. Conclusion 
The district court erred when it found dismissed, by summary judgment, all 
of the Frantzes' affirmative defenses on account of its finding that the Frantzes 
lacked privity. Furthermore, the district court's Amended Judgment cannot be 
upheld on the alternate theories proposed by the Bank. Therefore, this Court 
should reverse the orders of the district court and deny Hawley Troxell's motion 
for summary judgment and remand this matter back for further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted on this 20th day of January, 2017. 
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